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CRIMINAL LAW
GRASSROOTS DEATH SENTENCES?: THE
SOCIAL MOVEMENT FOR CAPITAL CHILD
RAPE LAWS
MONICA C. BELL*
Despite the Supreme Court's 1977 ruling in Coker v. Georgia declaring use
of the death penalty for rape unconstitutional, there has been a recent
explosion of state statutes making the death penalty available for the rape
of a child. Numerous articles have tried to discern whether using the death
penalty for child rape comports with the Coker holding-often reaching
divergent conclusions-but none has focused first on the socio-political
setting that brought about these laws to inform their constitutional analysis.
This Article attempts to begin contextualizing capital child rape statutes
within a social movements framework. I argue that capital child rape
statutes can be attributed to three movements: the popular movement to
shame, fear, and isolate sex offenders; the feminist movement for harsher
punishment of sexual and intra-familial violence; and the legal and
political movement to punish attacks against vulnerable victims with death.
Understanding these statutes in a richer way helps shed light on their
potential constitutional problems.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is widely acknowledged that politics shapes the administration and
legal construction of death penalty law. Commentators on the politics of
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the death penalty tend to focus primarily on electoral politics, especially in
relation to judicial independence, clemency, and prosecutorial discretion.1
Electoral politics is often the engine behind when and how "tough" crime
bills are passed, why one offender is sentenced to death while another is
sentenced to life imprisonment, and why one person on death row is granted
clemency and another is not. There are also non-electoral socio-political
movements that shape and are shaped by death penalty law. To borrow
terminology from Dean Larry Kramer's 2004 book on popular
constitutionalism, constitutional doctrine on the death penalty is contoured,
and perhaps controlled, by "the people themselves. ' '2 The engagement of
non-juridical actors in interpreting and influencing constitutional law
through political action has already been analyzed in affirmative action
debates, the labor movement, and the women's equality movement,3 among
others, but the expansion of death penalty law through popular re-
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment has too often been dismissed as a
campaign tactic and, thus, underanalyzed.4
This Article examines one of the most politicized changes in death
penalty law today-states' authorization of capital punishment for child
rape-through the lens of social movements. I argue that capital child rape
statutes are formed at the nexus of three movements: the popular movement
to shame, fear, and isolate sex offenders; the feminist movement for harsher
1 See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death:
Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV.
759, 776-92 (1995). See generally Jeffrey Kubik & John Moran, Lethal Elections:
Gubernatorial Politics and the Timing of Executions, 46 J.L. & ECON. 1 (2003) (offering
empirical evidence that state executions are more likely to occur within gubernatorial
election cycles).
2 LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004).
3 See, e.g., Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of
Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436 (2005); William E. Forbath, The Shaping of
the American Labor Movement, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1111 (1989); Reva B. Siegel, Text in
Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L.
REV. 297 (2001). Cf Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the
New Politics of Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804 (2008) (arguing for the expansion
of law and social movements scholarship to the realm of private and international law).
4 See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Addressing Capital Punishment Through Statutory
Reform, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 10-11 (2002); Michael Mello, Essay, A Letter on a Lawyer's Life
of Death, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 121, 203 (1997). Note that, given the increasing popularity of
1436 capital child rape statutes, I would argue that the "sea-change" in state legislatures'
attitudes toward the death penalty that Carol Steiker and Jordan Steiker document has not
been uninterrupted. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Should Abolitionists Support
Legislative "Reform" of the Death Penalty?, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 417, 417 (2002); cf Jeffrey L.
Kirchmeier, Casting a Wider Net: Another Decade of Legislative Expansion of the Death




punishment of sexual and intrafamilial violence; and the legal and political
movement to punish attacks against vulnerable victims with death. In Part
II, I place capital child rape laws in legal and historical context. Part III
explains the recent burst of capital child rape legislation by focusing on the
movement toward intense community fear of sex offenders. Part IV
situates capital child rape laws within the feminist movement. Part V
focuses on the movement to expand death penalty eligibility. Part VI
compares the context of capital child rape statutes with the context
surrounding Coker, particularly with regard to race and mob frenzy. In
conclusion, Part VII suggests that the descriptive account of this Article
leads to a normative conclusion: The context of the new capital child rape
statutes raises serious questions about their constitutionality. Through a
social movement account, we can better discern how these statutes permit
and encourage "arbitrariness, discrimination, caprice, and mistake." 5
II. THE FIRST POST-COKER CAPITAL CHILD RAPE LAW IN CONTEXT
A. THE BILLY PITTMAN AND SARA CUSIMANO STORY
The story of Billy Pittman and Sara Cusimano is instructive of the
socio-political setting of capital child rape laws. On July 12, 1994, Billy
Pittman sought psychiatric help. He had recently parted ways his girlfriend,
he had been fired from his job as a short-order cook, and his temper was
getting out of control. This was not the first time he had encountered
difficulty managing his emotions. According to one psychologist,
childhood physical and emotional abuse, along with substance abuse
starting at age seven or eight, had contributed to a "life... filled with
problems caused by rage, anger, violence and inability to get along with
other people"; 6 these problems included two felony convictions and a
5 See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1144 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The
Court emphasized the importance of avoiding arbitrariness in much of its early 1970s death
penalty jurisprudence, most notably in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976)
("[D]iscretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly
arbitrary and capricious action."), and Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
6 Joe Darby, Pittman Sought Psychiatric Help, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Feb. 8,
1995, at B 1 (summarizing the testimony of defense psychological expert Mark Zimmerman);
see also James Vamey, Kidnap Suspect Has a Record: Victim Listed as Stable, TIMES-
PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Aug. 21, 1994, at BI (discussing Pittman's previous legal
problems). Pittman underscored these difficulties during questioning, calling himself a
"stupid a- that can't cope with his own problems." Joe Darby, Girl, 13, Recounts Carjack
Attack; Says Defendant Raped, Shot Her, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Feb. 7, 1995, at
Al [hereinafter Darby, Girl, 13, Recounts Carjack Attack]. The prosecution's psychiatric
expert expressed concern that Pittman was falsely portraying the severity of his mental
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number of other arrests.7  Pittman sought to check himself into East
Jefferson Mental Health Center in Metairie, Louisiana, a suburb of New
Orleans, but the hospital turned him away. No beds were available, and the
center's employees concluded that Pittman was not an emergency case.8
On August 18, Pittman, who may have been under the influence of
crack cocaine, 9 went to Time Saver convenience store in Kenner intending
to steal a car, as he had allegedly done about a week earlier from another
convenience store.' 0 Concurrently, Jefferson Parrish schoolteacher Andree
Daigre picked up her thirteen-year-old daughter, Sara Cusimano, from a
friend's home and stopped by Time Saver to get gas." Cusimano stayed in
the car while her mother went inside to pay. 2 Pittman jumped into the car,
brandishing a small automatic pistol, and sped away with Cusimano.
13
After an indeterminate amount of time, Pittman drove to an isolated field,
where he raped Cusimano and shot her once in the middle of her forehead.1
4
She was found the next morning in a pile of weeds alongside a remote
road.15 Cusimano, miraculously, was still alive: the bullet shattered before
it could enter her brain.
1 6
The Kenner community's response was swift and vigorous. People
rallied around Cusimano and her family, contributing to the "Kenner Victim
Trust Fund" to help cover the medical bills.' 7  Fellow Jefferson Parish
illness. Darby, Pittman Sought Psychiatric Help, supra (summarizing testimony of
prosecution psychiatric expert Dr. Robert Davis).
7 Varney, supra note 6.
8 Darby, Pittman Sought Psychiatric Help, supra note 6 (summarizing the testimony of
defense witness Dr. Robert Greve, director of the East Jefferson Mental Health Center).
Greve testified that Pittman fell into the least serious of the four admission categories
because he did not appear to be suicidal, he had not threatened suicide, and he was not a
former patient in relapse. Id.
9 Vamey, supra note 6.
1O See Darby, Girl, 13, Recounts Carjack Attack, supra note 6 (summarizing defendant
Billy Pittman's taped statement); Joe Darby, Witness: He Bragged of Assault, TIMES-
PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Jan. 31, 1995, at Al (summarizing the deposition of Patricia
Rhodes, an acquaintance of Pittman's).
I1 Joe Darby, Child-Rape Victim's Mother Points Out Pittman, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans), Feb. 4, 1995, at B1 (summarizing the testimony of prosecution witness Andree
Daigre); see also Pamela Coyle, Teachers Get OK to Donate Days; Some Plan to Give Sick
Time to Peer, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Dec. 9, 1994, at B1.
12 Darby, supra note 11.
13 id.
14 Darby, Girl, 13, Recounts Carjack Attack, supra note 6 (summarizing the testimony of
Sara Cusimano).
15 Varney, supra note 6.
16 Darby, Girl, 13, Recounts Carjack Attack, supra note 6.
17 Donations Sought for Injured Girl, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Sept. 8, 1994, at
B3. Cusimano's medical bills were a major concern for the family, and it likely motivated a
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School District teachers donated their unused sick leave to Daigre. 18 The
community's outrage was just as palpable as its sympathy: Police Chief
Nick Congemi called the event "one of the most horrible episodes... in
Kenner's history," and he described Pittman as "one of the most despicable
human beings who will ever walk this earth."'1 9
Pittman pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity to attempted first-
degree murder, aggravated rape, second-degree kidnapping, and carjacking.
After he was convicted on all counts, some of those closest to the case
expressed thinly veiled regret that Pittman's punishment could not be more
severe. Cusimano, commenting on "what white trash he is, how bad he is,"
stated that she "just want[ed] to get a call that he was killed in jail."20 When
Judge Melvin Zeno sentenced Pittman to life plus 160 years imprisonment,
he expressed hope that "the only way [Pittman] will leave prison is 'in a
body bag."' 21 The prosecutor, Walter Rothschild, was more direct: "The
penalty should be death for what this man did to a 13-year-old girl.",22 If the
shooting had killed Cusimano, Pittman almost certainly would have been
executed.23 Both Cusimano and Pittman were, in some sense, lucky.
Louisiana passed its capital aggravated child rape provision in 199524
during this period of outcries for stiffer penalties25 and sensationalized
civil suit filed against Time Saver by Cusimano and Daigre alleging inadequate security,
despite concerns that it would inhibit the criminal investigation. See Bob Warren, Abducted
Girl, Mom Sue Convenience Store, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Aug. 30, 1994, at B 1.
18 Coyle, supra note 11.
19 Varney, supra note 6.
20 Joe Darby & Chris Gray, Victim Breaks Silence After Attacker Convicted, TIMES-
PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Feb. 9, 1995, at Al.
21 Joe Darby, Rapist Sentenced to Life for Trying to Kill Girl, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans), Mar. 16, 1995, at BI [hereinafter Darby, Rapist Sentenced to Life]. A state
appellate court eventually reduced Pittman's sentence, however fruitlessly, to life plus 120
years. Joe Darby, Kenner Rapist's Kidnap Charge Dropped, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans), Oct. 4, 1996, at B2.
22 Darby, Rapist Sentenced to Life, supra note 21.
23 Numerous murder defendants with similar or worse backgrounds and psychological
profiles than Pittman's have been executed. For example, Vamell Weeks, who suffered
from paranoid schizophrenia, and Richard Allan Moran, who was severely clinically
depressed, were both declared competent. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 391 (1993)
(holding that the standard for competency to plead guilty or waive the right to counsel and
competency to stand trial are the same, and ultimately resulting in the 1996 execution of
Moran despite evidence of mental illness); Weeks v. Jones, 26 F.3d 1030, 1047 (11th Cir.
1994) (finding Weeks competent to be executed because he could answer questions and tell
the difference between right and wrong).
24 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (2007). The legislation was introduced in the previous
session but did not get through. Although the outrage generated by the Pittman-Cusimano
story helped set the stage for the legislation, Pittman, ironically, would not be death-eligible
under the law because Cusimano was thirteen. The statute is limited to crimes in which the
victim is under twelve.
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stories of child rape.26 Louisiana is now the only state with an inmate on
death row for a non-homicide crime.27 Similar legislation has arisen in
other states. Florida and Mississippi had capital child rape statutes, but
their state supreme courts struck them down in the 1980s. 28 Currently, six
states-Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, South Carolina, Oklahoma, and
Montana-have laws authorizing the death penalty for child rape.29
Texas,30 Tennessee, 3 1 and Alabama 32 are currently considering capital child
25 See, e.g., James Gill, Editorial, Death for Rapists Gets Green Light, but Not
Castration, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Apr. 28, 1995, at B7 (claiming that Louisiana
legislators had been "unmanned" because they added a death penalty provision, but not a
proposed castration provision, to the aggravated rape statute); Joseph W. Spohrer, Jr., Letter
to the Editor, Administer Cane Lashes for Rape, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Feb. 1, 1995, at
6B.
26 See, e.g., Father Admits Raping 2 Baby Girls, Cops Say, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans), Oct. 22, 1994, at B1 (rape of a five-month-old and a twenty-month-old by their
father); Judge Metes Life Sentence in Child Rape, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Jan. 20, 1995,
at 10A (rape of a seven-year-old); Tim Talley, Man Gets 75 Years for Sexual Assaults on
Girls, 5, 3, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), May 27, 1995, at 2B; Rebecca Theim, Terrytown
Man Found Guilty of Kidnapping, Molesting Tot, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), June 15,
1994, at B 1 (rape of a four-year-old). Unsettling child rape stories from other states also
appeared in local papers. See, e.g., Maria Williams, Circle of Pedophile Families
Uncovered: 50 Children Used for Sex by Parents, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), June 18,
1995, at A22, originally printed as Marla Williams & Dee Norton, The Unraveling of a
Monstrous Secret, SEATTLE TIMES, June 8, 1995, at Al.
27 Dennis Powell, Attorneys Ask Court to Declare Death Penalty "Cruel and Unusual"
Punishment for Child Rapist: Louisiana Man Is Only Inmate on Death Row for a
Nonhomicide Offense, ABC NEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/SupremeCourt/
story?id=3586601&page=l; see also infra text accompanying notes 69-78.
28 See Buford v. State, 403 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 1981); Leatherwood v. State, 548 So. 2d 389
(Miss. 1989). For more information on how the Florida Supreme Court struck down
Florida's capital child rape statute, see Adam Liptak, Louisiana Sentence Renews Debate on
the Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2003. Currently, Florida's default penalty for
"capital sexual battery" is life imprisonment. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 794.011(2)(a), 775.082(2),
921.141(1) (West Supp. 2007).
29 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(2)(a); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-1(a)-(b) (2001); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (Supp. 2006); MONT. CODE ANN. 45-5-503(3)(c)(1) (2005); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10 § 7115.1 (West Supp. 2007); S.C. CODE. ANN. § 16-3-655 (Supp. 2006) (limiting
application to repeat offenders). Coker v. Georgia struck down Georgia's law. See 433 U.S.
584 (1977). Georgia legislators attempted to pass new capital child rape legislation in 1997
and 1999, but they were defeated both times. H.B. 116, 145th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga.
1999); H.B. 801, 144th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 1997).
" H.B. 8, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2007) (limiting application to death for second-
time offenders). The leader of the Texas movement to toughen laws on child predators is
new Lt. Gov. David Dewhurst who, at his inauguration, proclaimed in his discussion of
Jessica's Law, "There's tough. And then there's Texas tough." David Dewhurst, Lieutenant
Governor of Texas, Inaugural Address (Jan. 16, 2007), available at
http://www.ltgov.state.tx.us (follow "Speeches" hyperlink; then follow "2007 Texas
Inauguration Address" hyperlink). His stance has earned the support of America's Most
Wanted producer John Walsh and Fox News host Bill O'Reilly, though Walsh is hesitant to
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rape legislation. Several states, including Utah, Mississippi, California,
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and possibly others, have considered but not
passed capital child rape statutes.33 It is uncertain whether these statutes
would survive Eighth Amendment scrutiny.
B. THE LEGAL HISTORY OF CAPITAL CHILD RAPE LAWS
Capital child rape laws, though spurred by stories like Sara
Cusimano's and resultant community outrage, rest upon a more nuanced
legal history. Part II.B elaborates the legal history of capital child rape law
through first examining Coker v. Georgia, the 1977 Supreme Court case
that barred capital rape statutes.34 I then examine how state courts and legal
scholars have interpreted the Coker ruling.
1. Coker v. Georgia
In 1977's Coker v. Georgia, the Supreme Court struck down a Georgia
law that made the death penalty available for the rape of an adult woman,
finding the punishment "grossly disproportionate and excessive, 35 and
therefore in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Erlich Anthony Coker, the
petitioner, was serving a prison sentence for rape, murder, kidnapping, and
support the death penalty provision. Hilary Hylton, Death Penalty for Child Molesters?,
TIME, May 2, 2007, available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/
0,8599,1616890,00.html. The bill has passed the Texas House and Senate.
"' S.B. 22, 105th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2007); see also Beverly A. Carroll, Bill
Would Add Death Penalty for Child Rape, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, Jan. 13, 2007.
The Tennessee statute may lose steam this session because Senator Doug Jackson, the bill's
chief sponsor, has recently sponsored legislation calling for an examination of the state's
entire death penalty, concerned that innocent people are being executed. Brian Lazenby,
Full Exam of Death Penalty Pushed, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, Apr. 16, 2007, at
Al.
32 H.B. 335, 2007 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2007); see, e.g., Eric Velasco, Bill Seeks Death for
Molestation, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Apr. 9, 2007, at IA.
" See A.B. 35, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999); H.B. 558, 1997 Reg. Sess. (Miss.
1997); cf H.B. 86, 2007 Gen. Leg. Sess. (Utah 2007); Megan O'Matz, Pa. House GOP
Chiefs Eye Death Penalty for Sex Crimes, MORNING CALL (Allentown, Pa.), Jan. 28. 1997, at
Al. Seventy-five percent of Pennsylvanians polled while the bill was under consideration
supported death for sex offenders. See Robert C. Sandl, Comment, Wider Death Penalty Is
Dangerous, MORNING CALL (Allentown, Pa.), Feb. 7, 1997, at A14.
14 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
35 Id. at 597. Only a plurality, Justices White, Stewart, Blackmun, and Stevens, agreed
that capital punishment is generally constitutionally permissible, but using it as punishment
for the rape of an adult woman is always unconstitutional. Justices Brennan and Marshall
wrote separately to state that all capital punishment is unconstitutional; Justice Powell wrote
separately to clarify that not all laws allowing the death penalty in rape cases are
unconstitutional per se. It is also worth noting that the "adult woman" in Coker was sixteen
years old. Id. at 605 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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aggravated assault. Coker escaped from prison and entered the home of
Allen and Elnita Carter, where he allegedly tied up and robbed Allen and
raped and kidnapped Elnita. In the trial's guilt phase, a jury rejected
Coker's insanity plea and found him guilty of escape, armed robbery, motor
vehicle theft, kidnapping, and rape. In the penalty phase, a jury sentenced
Coker to death under section 26-2001 of the Georgia Code Annotated,36
which stipulated that "[a] person convicted of rape shall be punished by
death or by imprisonment for life, or by imprisonment for not less than one
nor more than 20 years." The jury considered as aggravating factors his
prior conviction of a capital felony and the fact that the rape was committed
in the course of another capital felony, armed robbery. The petitioner was
sentenced for committing the rape of an "adult woman."
The Court's Eighth Amendment analysis centered around the concept
of proportionality, which originated in Weems v. United States's "precept of
justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to
[the] offense."37 The Court's plurality opinion by Justice White and joined
by Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Stevens used "guidance in history and
from the objective evidence of the country's present judgment, 38 such as
states' traditional approach toward death penalty availability for rape, the
behavior of sentencing juries, and the number of states that allowed the
death penalty for rape. At the time, Georgia was the only state that made
the death penalty available for rape, and the Court pointed out that at no
point in history has a majority of states permitted death sentencing for
rape.39 Moreover, sentencing juries rarely imposed the death penalty for
rape, doing so in only six of sixty-three cases that reached the state supreme
court level. The Georgia Supreme Court overturned one of those,
36 GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2001 (1972).
3' 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910); see also Shawn E. Fields, Note, Constitutional
Comparativism and the Eighth Amendment: How a Flawed Proportionality Requirement
Can Benefit from Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L. REv. 963, 973 (2006). The most enduring legacy
of Coker has been its application of the proportionality test in the death penalty context. The
Court again applied the proportionality principle in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797
(1982), to find that capital punishment is disproportionate in cases where a perpetrator "does
not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force will be
employed." The Court also employed proportionality review in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 311-13 (2002), which barred the execution of the mentally retarded, and Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560-61 (2005), which ruled that death sentences for those under
eighteen are cruel and unusual. Since Coker, various courts and Justices have debated
whether the Eighth Amendment imposes a proportionality requirement for all criminal cases,
not just death penalty cases. Justice Scalia, in particular, has explicitly rejected
proportionality analysis. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991) ("[T]he
Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee.").




underscoring the rare implementation of death sentences in rape cases. The
Court also examined a subjective component in its review, the effectiveness
of death as a deterrent for rape.40
Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred in the judgment, citing their
overall opposition to the death penalty.4' Justice Powell concurred in part
and dissented in part, arguing that, while the Court was correct in its
determination that the death penalty is a disproportionate penalty in this
case, the Court overreached by concluding that death is a disproportionate
penalty in adult rape cases per se. Justice Powell was not ready to establish
that death is a disproportionate penalty even for aggravated rape.42 Finally,
Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented on several
grounds. First, there was a federalism problem-the Chief Justice
maintained that this rule encroached upon legislatures' ability to punish
recidivists. Second, he argued that rape is a sufficiently heinous crime that
causes enough damage that the death penalty could be justified. Third, he
disagreed with the plurality's assessment of death's deterrence value in rape
cases.
43
Commentators disagree on whether the Coker ruling precluded using
the death penalty for child rape. The conventional wisdom has been that the
death penalty is barred in all non-homicide cases, but neither the language
nor the posture of the opinion is conclusive. The plurality opinion was
littered with statements from which one would infer that it intended to
declare unconstitutional all capital punishment for non-homicidal rapes.
The opinion straightforwardly states, "We have concluded that a sentence
of death is grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime
of rape and is therefore forbidden by the Eighth Amendment as cruel and
unusual punishment., 44  Even more convincingly, Justice Powell's
concurrence assumes that the ruling applies to all rape and, in fact, he
dissented in part on that basis: "[T]he plurality draws a bright line between
murder and all rapes-regardless of the degree of brutality of the rape or




The countervailing opinion, however, is that the Court's frequent use
of the phrase "the rape of an adult woman" was an effort to limit its
holding. The petitioner's brief introduced this language, even though it was
40 For further explanation of the two-part proportionality test, see, for example, Ryan
Norwood, None Dare Call It Treason: The Constitutionality of the Death Penalty for
Peacetime Espionage, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 820, 827-33 (2002).
41 Coker, 433 U.S. at 600 (Brennan, J., concurring; Marshall, J., concurring).
42 Id. at 601.
43 Id. at 604 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
44 Id. at 592 (plurality opinion).
45 Id. at 603 (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
2007]
MONICA C BELL
not in the statute,46 and the Court embraced this age-based distinction.47
The opinion thus opened a loophole in the holding, leaving available the
possibility that the death penalty for more "extreme" rapes, like child rape
or other aggravated rape, might not violate the Eighth Amendment. The
federal death penalty law, which was expanded in 1994, permits death
sentences in non-homicide cases like treason, 48 espionage, 49 large-scale
drug trafficking,50 and participation in the attempted murder of a juror,
witness, or any other official involved in a case concerning a "Continuing
Criminal Enterprise" (such as the Mafia).5 A federal law passed in the
1990s may be a poor indicator of what the Court meant in the 1970s, but the
availability of the death penalty through this statute may bolster the
argument of those who do not find that Coker means that the death penalty
is cruel and unusual in virtually all non-homicide cases. Legal scholars and
others have identified the loophole that the "adult woman" language left in
Coker. Eugene Volokh summarizes the debate surrounding non-homicide
capital punishment most effectively:
It is possible that the death penalty may still be available for child rape and for very
serious national security crimes such as treason and espionage. But the Court must
have understood Coker as practically limiting the death penalty almost exclusively toS • 52
murder prosecutions, which is how it has indeed been applied in practice.
Questions about constitutionality chilled deliberations in some states but
intensified them in others. In Utah, police officer and Republican state
representative Carl Wimmer had originally pushed in committee to make
repeat child molestation punishable by death in his state's version of
Jessica's Law.53 However, he abandoned that effort because of concerns
that the law would violate the Eighth Amendment.54 Conversely, in South
Carolina, the legislature heard testimony from the State Attorney General
46 Brief of Petitioner at 21, Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, No. 75-5444 (1977) (No. 75-
5444).
47 Coker, 433 U.S. at 592-94 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 614-15 (Burger, C.J. and
Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
48 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (2000).
41 18 U.S.C. § 794 (2000).
0 18 U.S.C. § 3591(b) (2000).
5' 18 U.S.C. § 3591(b)(2).
52 Eugene Volokh, Crime Severity and Constitutional Line-Drawing, 90 VA. L. REV.
1957, 1968 (2004).
" See infra Part III.
54 Matt Canham, Stern Sex-Offenders Penalty Bill Advances, SALT LAKE TRIB., Feb. 3,
2007, at B6 ("Wimmer... wanted prosecutors to be able to seek the death penalty for repeat
child molesters. Concerns about the constitutionality of such a move forced him to take a
step back."). The Utah Attorney General nicknamed the bill that advanced to the full House,
which made repeat child sex offenders eligible for life sentences, the "let them rot" bill. Id.
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seeking to quell the debates about constitutionality that unsettled some
legislators. The attorney general assured members that the law would not
be overturned because Americans are more anti-crime and pro-death
penalty than they were during the Coker era.55 At least one commentator in
a local op-ed noted that some supporters of the South Carolina statute were
seeking a hearing before the Supreme Court; these activists hoped to
capitalize on the Coker loophole because they believed the Supreme Court
had become sufficiently conservative to uphold capital punishment for child
rape.56 Legislatures which pass these statutes are not merely responding to
public opinion, but are on a deeper level asserting a popular constitutional
conception that death is a suitable punishment for some types of rape. They
are indirectly embracing Justice Powell's concurrence in Coker.
2. The Coker Loophole in State Courts
To date, the Court has not addressed the Coker loophole. Bethley v.
Louisiana asked the Court to do so, but the Court denied certiorari.57
Bethley was an appeal to State v. Wilson, the first case to challenge the
Louisiana law.58 Defendant Anthony Wilson was charged with raping a
five-year-old girl; defendant Patrick Dewayne Bethley allegedly raped three
girls, aged five, seven, and nine.5 9 One of Bethley's alleged victims was his
daughter, and, even more disturbingly, Bethley was HIV-positive. 60 The
State contended Bethley was aware of his status when he raped the girls.61
Wilson and Bethley were both indicted for aggravated rape but successfully
sought to quash the indictment, arguing that capital punishment for
aggravated rape is unconstitutional. The State appealed both cases.
The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the capital rape statute. It used
the proportionality analysis of Coker, but concluded that because "[r]ape of
a child less than twelve years of age is like no other crime" and since
"[c]hildren are a class of people that need special protection," child rape is
55 Schuyler Kropf, Senate OKs Death for Repeat Child-Rape Offenders, POST & COURIER
(Charleston, S.C.), Mar. 30, 2006, at B1.
56 Op-Ed., Punishing Child Molesters, ROCK HILL HERALD, Mar. 29, 2006, at 6A.
" 520 U.S. 1259 (1997). The Louisiana court ruled 3-2, and Chief Justice Calogero
faced a nasty reelection campaign two years later as a result. See Joe Gyan Jr., Campaign
Stance, TVAds Prompt Lawsuit, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Oct. 7, 1998, at 5B.
58 685 So. 2d 1063 (La. 1996).
59 Rhonda Bell, Rape Suspect Not Ready for Trial, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Dec.
16, 1999, at B1.
60 id.
61 Patrick Bethley ultimately struck a plea agreement and was sentenced to life
imprisonment. Id. Anthony Wilson is mentally retarded, with an IQ of 61. It is unclear




sufficiently heinous that a death sentence is proportionate punishment.62
The Louisiana court also addressed the broader question of whether murder
is in all instances a more serious crime that even adult rape, maintaining
that "[i]n some cases women have preferred death to being raped or hav
preferred not to continue living after being raped., 63 The court also focused
on the public injury that a child rapist inflicts. The Wilson court noted that
the Coker Court also recognized both the importance of injury to the victim
and public harm, and concluded that child rape may be sufficiently
injurious to society that death is a warranted penalty.64 The Wilson court
did not specifically enumerate the harms done to society when a child is
raped, but it relied upon them generally in its analysis.
When the Supreme Court denied Bethley's petition for certiorari,
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, issued an
addendum to reassert that the Court's decision to deny certiorari does not
constitute a ruling on the merits.65 Justice Stevens posited that there might
be a jurisdictional defect in the case: because Bethley had not been
sentenced, or even convicted of a crime, the state court's decision
technically may not have been "final. 66 Perhaps these three Justices will
grant certiorari in a case where defendants have actually been convicted of
child rape and sentenced to death.
The controversy over capital child rape statutes largely fell by the
wayside for several years. Then, in 2003, Patrick Kennedy was convicted
of the 1998 rape of his eight-year-old stepdaughter. The girl was raped so
brutally that an expert witness testified that her injuries were the most
extensive that he had ever seen.6 7 Before calling an ambulance to care for
her, Kennedy telephoned a friend to ask him how to get blood stains out of
a white carpet, professing that his stepdaughter "became a young lady."68
Initially the girl claimed that the perpetrators were two teenage boys who
62 Wilson, 685 So. 2d at 1067; see also LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5 (2007).
For further discussion, see, for example, Jennifer L. Cordle, Note, State v. Wilson: Social
Discontent, Retribution, and the Constitutionality of Capital Punishment for Raping a Child,
27 CAP. U. L. REv. 135 (1998), and Annaliese Flynn Fleming, Comment, Louisiana's
Newest Capital Crime: The Death Penalty for Child Rape, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
717 (1999).
63 Wilson, 685 So. 2d at 1066 n.3.
6 Id. at 1070.
65 Bethley v. Louisiana, 520 U.S. 1259, 1259 (1997).
66 Id. Justice Stevens implied that once a final judgment was rendered pursuant to
Louisiana's revamped section 14:42 (which has happened in Patrick Kennedy's case, see
infra text accompanying notes 73-79), these three Justices might be more inclined to grant
certiorari.




attacked her when she was selling Girl Scout cookies in her garage, but the
physical evidence belied this claim. Once the girl was removed from her
mother's care, she accused Kennedy.69
Kennedy became the only person in the United States on death row
who had not been convicted of murder. His sentencing happened only a
couple of years before the flurry to adopt Jessica's Law. Kennedy presented
an ideal opportunity to re-litigate the issues first raised in Wilson. On May
22, 2007, the Louisiana Supreme Court again upheld the state's capital
child rape law in State v. Kennedy.70 The court's analysis was extensive.7'
The court reaffirmed the argument it made in Wilson based on the Coker
proportionality test, then moved to an analysis of the statute in light of the
new jurisprudence arising from Atkins v. Virginia and Roper v. Simmons,
which uses an objective "evolving standards of decency" framework.72 The
Louisiana court conducted a survey of the thirty-eight states that have the
death penalty and found that fourteen states permit death for non-homicide
crimes. In addition to the states that permit capital punishment for child
rape, five additional states permit death for crimes against the government,
such as treason, espionage, and aircraft piracy.73 Four states have capital
aggravated kidnapping laws.74 The court used the existence of several non-
homicide capital crimes to argue that no national consensus exists that the
death penalty for child rape is cruel and unusual.7 5 Immediately after the
court handed down the decision, attorney Jelpi Picou of Louisiana's Capital
Appeals Project announced plans to request a rehearing and, if denied,
69 Id. at 767.
70 Id. at 772-93. In addition to the constitutional claim, defense attorneys also raised
claims about procedural errors and race bias in jury foreman selection because Kennedy is
African-Ameriran. The defense unsuccessfully sought to overturn Kennedy's conviction,
not just his death sentence. For more information about the oral arguments in Kennedy, see
Paul Purpura, Child Rapist Contests Death Penalty, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Mar.
1, 2007, at 1. For a description of some of the more disturbing information the jury heard,
see Billy Sothem, A Cruel and Unusual Punishment, NATION, Apr. 24, 2007, available at
http://www.thenation.com/ doc/20070507/sothern.
71 Compared to the Wilson opinion, the Kennedy opinion was probably so significantly
detailed because there were numerous doctrinal omissions in the former, which was quite
brief and unspecific. The court needed to provide a much more comprehensive analysis in
order to increase the likelihood the capital child rape law would be upheld.
72 For a richer analysis of the Roper-Atkins framework and capital child rape statutes, see
Joanna H. D'Avella, Note, Death Row for Child Rape?: Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Under the Roper-Atkins "Evolving Standards of Decency " Framework, 92 CORNELL L. REv.
129, 144-55 (2006).
73 Kennedy, 957 So. 2d at 793 (listing these five states as Arkansas, California,
Mississippi, New Mexico, and Washington).
74 Id. (listing these states as Colorado, Idaho, Montana, and South Dakota).
71 Id. at 792.
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petition the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari.76  The recent upswing in
capital child rape statutes and the procedural posture of this case may
influence the Court to hear this case if petitioned.
3. Scholarly Responses to Capital Child Rape Laws and the Coker
Loophole
Thus far, academic conversation about capital child rape statutes has
focused mainly on constitutional doctrinal concerns.77 The vast majority of
scholarship has focused upon the proportionality issues raised in Coker and
pointed to defects in the Wilson court's analysis; most commentators object
to the interpretation of Coker's "rape of an adult woman" language as a
limitation on its application to capital child rape laws. One author argues
that the Wilson court misapplied proportionality review, leaving out a
crucial objective factor. In his view, the State failed to compare adequately
the punishments for other crimes in Louisiana with the harshness of the
punishment for child rape.78 The author also found that the State failed to
consider the behavior of sentencing juries, which chose not to sentence
child rapists to death in 90% of cases. 79 Another author has criticized,
among other issues, the Wilson court's analysis about arbitrariness and
capriciousness. The Wilson court ignored that the list of mitigating factors
used to limit which crimes are death-eligible was written to apply to murder
crimes, meaning that juries would be ill-equipped to discern which factors
should advise against death sentences in child rape cases.8 ° Others focus
less on critiques of Wilson's reasoning per se and instead argue more
broadly that only homicide is sufficiently severe to warrant the penalty of
death.8'
76 Louisiana Supreme Court: Death Penalty OK for Child Rapist, Assoc. PRESS, May 23,
2007, available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,274954,00.html.
77 See, e.g., Chandler Bailey, Death Is Different, Even on the Bayou: The
Disproportionality of Crime and Punishment in Louisiana's Capital Child Rape Statute, 55
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1335 (1998); Yale Glazer, Child Rapists Beware! The Death Penalty
and Louisiana's Amended Aggravated Rape Statute, 25 AM. J. CRiM. L. 79 (1997); Pamela J.
Lormand, Proportionate Sentencing for Rape of a Minor: The Death Penalty Dilemma, 73
TuL. L. REv. 981 (1999).
78 Bailey, supra note 77, at 1366.
79 Id. at 1367.
80 Lormand, supra note 77, at 1007-08. For further discussion of the role of mitigating
and aggravating factors in death penalty cases, see infra Part IV.
81 See, e.g., Pallie Zambrano, Comment, The Death Penalty Is Cruel and Unusual




The newest articles take up the "evolving standards" question through
the lens of Atkins v. Virginia82 and Roper v. Simmons,83 which asks, among
other things, whether there is a "national consensus" in support of or against
punishing the worst instances of child rape with death.84 The scholarship
reaches varied conclusions. One author contends that because only twelve
of the thirty-eight death penalty states permit capital punishment for non-
homicide crimes, there is a national consensus against all non-homicide
death sentences, including those in reference to child rape. 85  Another
author takes an opposite position, maintaining that capital child rape
statutes should be held constitutional.86 She looks to the "consistency of the
direction of the trend," not merely the number of states with capital child
rape laws, as evidence that there is a burgeoning national consensus that
child rape is serious enough to warrant the penalty of death.87 However,
neither author engages with capital child rape statutes outside of the narrow
question of whether enough legislatures have passed capital child rape laws
to constitute a national consensus under the Court's definition. These
articles do not explore the circumstances surrounding these statutes or the
popular movements that have shaped how legislatures have behaved.
Finally, one author takes a different approach, critically analyzing these
statutes through a feminist lens by dissecting the language and approach of
predominantly male judges, scholars, and legislators who advocate for
capital child rape laws, concluding that their approach tends to reinforce
patriarchal ideas.88
Scholarly discussion of these statutes has largely neglected the social
and political context in which these statutes are being developed, and this
context is an important piece of understanding how these statutes interact
with constitutional law. A fairly recent trend in legal scholarship has been
expanding the rote study of pure doctrine to examine the social context of
legislation, because it is society-legislators, grassroots activists, popular
culture-that shapes our legislative process and constitutional
understandings. Often, it is not the Court's power to "say what the law is"
82 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (declaring unconstitutional execution of the mentally retarded).
83 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (declaring unconstitutional use of the death penalty in cases
where the convicted person is a juvenile at the time of the crime).
84 The Court elaborated the current "evolving standards of decency" framework in Atkins
and Roper. The phrase was originally employed by Justice Warren in Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 101 (1958). See D'Avella, supra note 72; Ashley M. Kearns, Note, South
Carolina's Evolving Standards of Decency, 58 S.C. L. Rnv. 509 (2007).
85 D'Avella, supra note 72, at 149-52.
86 Kearns, supra note 84, at 511.
.17 Id. at 521-22.
88 See Corey Rayburn, Better Dead Than Raped?: The Patriarchal Rhetoric Driving
Capital Rape Statutes, 78 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 1119, 1143-48 (2004).
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that determines the interpretation of the Constitution; it is the citizens'
interaction with legislatures and administrative agencies. As Reva Siegel
writes, "[C]onstitutional culture enables movements to negotiate the
law/politics distinction and propose (or resist) alternative understandings of
the constitutional tradition., 89  In the case of capital child rape statutes,
activists and lawmakers are, through participating in a social movement
focusing on child molestation, proposing an alternative understanding of
Coker that contradicts the conventional view that the case ruled out death
penalty for all rape cases.
III. A REAWAKENING OF OUTRAGE: TOWARD "JESSICA'S LAW"
In Wilson, the Louisiana Supreme Court suggested that other states
would soon follow Louisiana's lead by passing capital child rape
provisions.9" This prediction did not materialize until 2005, although
Georgia attempted to pass a similar statute in 1997, which was ultimately
defeated in the State Senate.91 In February 2005, John Evander Couey
kidnapped, raped, and murdered nine-year-old Jessica Lunsford of
Homosassa, Florida. 92 The story enraptured the country,93 much like stories
of other young white female victims such as Megan Kanka and Polly
Klaas.94 Lunsford's death, similar to Kanka's, led to a national firestorm
89 Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional
Change: The Case of the defacto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1329 (2006). For a greater
understanding of the popular constitutionalism or social movement-oriented legal theories,
see LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 CAL.
L. REv. 959 (2004); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the
People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1 (2003); and Ernest A.
Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408 (2007).
90 State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1068 (La. 1996) (suggesting "the beginning of a
trend and public opinion favoring such penalties-an evolution of a standard to deal with
this heinous crime").
91 See Kathy Scruggs, Ruling on Sexual Predators, ATLANTA J. & CONST., June 28, 1997,
at 5D.
92 Couey confessed. See Suspect in 9-year-old's Death Booked into Florida Jail,
CNN.COM, http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/03/19/missing.girl. Sheriff Jeff Dawsy called
Couey "a piece of trash." Id.
93 A LexisNexis search of the database "News, All (English, Full Text)" shows that
Jessica Lunsford's name appeared in over 2000 articles-just in 2005.
94 Seven-year-old Megan Kanka-the inspiration for "Megan's Law," Pub. L. No. 104-
145, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996), which established sex offender registration in each state--was
raped and murdered in 1994. Twelve-year-old Polly Klaas was abducted in 1993. For more
information about Kanka, see The Megan Nicole Kanka Foundation,
http://www.megannicolekankafoundation.org/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2008); for information
on Klaas, see KlaasKids Foundation, Polly's Story, http://www.klaaskids.org/pg-
pollystory.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2008).
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over the legal status of sex offenders and, ultimately, to a ubiquitous law
bearing her name. Florida's then-Governor Jeb Bush signed the Jessica
Lunsford Act on May 2, 2005, a fast-tracked piece of legislation that
established twenty-five-year mandatory minimum sentences for offenses
against children under the age of twelve and a satellite tracking system for
sex offenses more generally.95 The Jessica Marie Lunsford Foundation, led
by Jessica's father, began to lobby nationwide for similar legislation.96
Spurred by grassroots and media activism,97 state legislatures began to
pursue their own versions of Jessica's Law. While most contained similar
controls to Florida's, others were more zealous, instigated by recent local
crimes. For example, shortly before the South Carolina Legislature began
debating its capital child rape provision, the state's major newspapers
reported that two teenaged women had been abducted, taken to an
underground bunker, and raped. The defendant, Kenneth Glenn Hinson,
had previously been convicted of raping another young girl. State political
reporters directly linked the "dungeon rape" story to the capital child rape
debate.98  Hinson was eventually acquitted because of severe
inconsistencies in the alleged victims' stories,99 but the incident paved the
way for the state's stiff version of Jessica's Law.
While Texas has not yet signed into law a capital child rape statute, the
state is in the throes of an intense debate over H.B. 8 ("Texas Children
First"), which after some delay has passed both the state house and senate
and is now proceeding through additional conferencing.100 Pressure from
9' H.B. 1877, available at http://election.dos.state.fl.us/laws/05laws/ch_2005-028.pdf;
see also Richard Luscombe, Florida 's Tough Stand Against Child Molesters, CHRISTIAN SCL
MONITOR, May 4, 2005, at 2.
96 The Jessica Marie Lunsford Foundation, http://www.jmlfoundation.org (last visited
Mar. 12, 2008).
97 See, e.g., Gil Bliss, Milford Man Works for NH "Jessica's Law," UNION LEADER
(Manchester, NH), July 26, 2005, at BI (discussing a trucking company owner who planned
a petition drive and rally to spur passage of Jessica's Law in New Hampshire). The father of
two said that he "got to the point where [he]'d had enough and had to try and do something."
Id. Media activism has been essential in the passage of Jessica's Law. Controversial Fox
News host Bill O'Reilly has made Jessica's Law a central part of his show, launching a fifty-
state campaign and encouraging viewers to start petition drives. See BillOReilly.com,
Jessica's Law: A State-by-State Report Card of Child Protection Law,
http://www.billoreilly.com/outragefunnels (last visited Dec. 9, 2007).
98 John Frank, Death Penalty for Some Molesters Ok'd, POST & COURIER (Charleston,
S.C.), June 1, 2006, at B1; Tim Smith, High Court Called Key to Pedophile Execution,
GREENVILLE NEWS, Mar. 25, 2006, at IA.
99 Meg Kinnard, Man Acquitted in "Dungeon'" Rapes, ASSOC. PRESS, Apr. 23, 2007,
available at http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=3067843.
199 See supra note 30 and accompanying text; Emily Ramshaw, Bill on Sex Offenders
Delayed: Concerns Indicated over Measure That Would Allow Death Penalty, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Mar. 1, 2007, at 6A. The Senate version is S.B. 68. For discussion of the
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national media figure Bill O'Reilly's referring to Texas's sex offender
sentencing laws as "soft" convinced Governor Rick Perry to pursue a
capital child rape law vigorously.'
01
The national frenzy surrounding sexual molestation is not new, nor is
it limited to pockets of community outrage. Former Attorney General
Alberto Gonzales has referred to an American "epidemic" of child sexual
exploitation, referring not only to child rape itself, but also child
pornography. 0 2  Pop culture has also spurred more widespread concern
about sex offenders. For example, Dateline NBC's popular primetime
television show To Catch a Predator features hidden camera investigations
of "potential child predators," lured to various locations by investigators
posing as children in Internet chat rooms. According to NBC, the stings
have exposed over two hundred "potential child predators." 103 To Catch a
Predator's host, Chris Hansen, has become a folk hero of sorts and has
even authored a successful book, To Catch a Predator: Protecting Your
Kids from Enemies Already in Your Home. 104
There are more serious, legal responses to fear of sex offenders. Post-
release sex offender residency restrictions, which usually bar sex offenders
from living within a certain radius of a school, a day care center, a park, a
library, or a bus stop, have presented extreme challenges to municipalities.
Thirteen states, including Alabama, Arkansas, California, Georgia, Iowa,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Tennessee, have passed such
statutes over the past five years, and there are also a number of counties and
municipalities with similar ordinances. 10 5 As an example of some of the
political debate over "Texas Children First," see, for example, Polly Ross Hughes, Death
Penalty for Sex Offenders May Be Hard Sell, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 10, 2007, at B1, and
R.G. Ratcliffe, Tougher Predator Law Gets Big Push, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 14, 2007, at
B1.
101 See supra note 30. O'Reilly labeled thirteen states "soft on child offenders,"
including, ironically, Texas. Governor Perry objected to this label and appeared on
O'Reilly's show to defend his state. He remarked, "[W]e've been called a lot of things in
Texas. Soft on crime is not one of them." O'Reilly responded that the sentencing laws were
not sufficiently stringent. The O'Reilly Factor (Fox News television broadcast July 12,
2005).
102 Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General of the United States, Address to Employees at
the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (Apr. 20, 2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2006/ag-speech. 060420.html.
103 See Online Enemies Already in Your Home, MSNBC.COM, Mar. 14, 2007,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/ 17584928.
104 CHRIS HANSEN, To CATCH A PREDATOR: PROTECTING YOUR KIDS FROM ENEMIES
ALREADY IN YOUR HOME (2007).
105 Caleb Durling, Never Going Home: Does It Make Us Safer? Does It Make Sense? Sex
Offenders, Residency Restrictions, and Reforming Risk Management Law, 97 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 317, 322-25 (2006).
[Vol. 98
GRASSROOTS DEATH SENTENCES?
consequences of this explosion of ordinances, The New York Times has
highlighted sex offenders with no other choice but to live under a bridge in
Miami.
106
States' consideration of lifetime sentences and the death penalty is
understandable in light of these and other post-release challenges for sex
offender reentry. For example, Oklahoma passed its capital child rape
statute after the attack of one of five residents in a group home for sex
offenders by a group of neighborhood men.1°7 The owner of the house
reported that it took months for the residents to find a location for the group
home due to ordinances that require group homes to be a certain distance
from schools. 10 8  The community, however, was unsympathetic: one
woman, who said that she locks her children inside their house because of
the group home, said that they were "the ones being punished." 10 9 Released
sex offenders are also vulnerable to more serious cases of vigilante
"justice." Perhaps no case better illustrates this than the 2006 murders of
William Elliott and Joseph L. Gray, both registrants on Maine's sex
offender website. A Canadian man obtained their names and addresses
from the registry and murdered them both before committing suicide.
Despite the risk of crime against offenders, Maine state legislators continue
to support the registry.10° Governments across the United States are
struggling to discern what to do with released sex offenders, particularly
those who committed offenses against a minor. One option, embodied in
capital child rape statutes and life sentences without parole, is to never
release them.
In addition to communities and mass culture, activists have been
pressing for harsher penalties for sexual offense in ways that might prima
facie justify capital child rape statutes. In particular, some iterations of
feminism that focus on societal recognition of the evils of rape and
domestic violence could be perversely interpreted to support these laws.
IV. FEMINISM AND LEGAL INTERVENTION IN SEXUAL VIOLENCE
One major and well-documented accomplishment of the feminist
movement, and particularly the battered women's movement, has been the
critique and gradual weakening of the line between the "personal" and the
106 Associated Press, Sex Offenders Living Under Miami Bridge, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8.
2007, at 22.




110 Durling, supra note 105, at 326; see also John R. Ellement & Suzanne Smalley, Sex
Crime Disclosure Questioned, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 18, 2006, at Al.
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"political."' 11  The breaking down of that distinction has enabled greater
legal protection of women and children from physical and sexual violence
within the home. In other words, the legal regime has moved from one that
"will not invade the domestic forum or go behind the curtain ' 1 2 to one that
provides legal protection against physical spousal and child abuse, marital
rape, and incest. 113 Battered women's advocates have brought about this
legal change by working with unlikely allies, including conservatives. As
Wayne Logan points out, domestic violence laws in particular brought
activists on the Left and the Right together: "[A]lthough a 'women's issue,'
they combined the appeal of the 'tough on crime' sensibility with a precept
that liberals and conservatives alike could subscribe to: 'Beating women is
wrong.'
114
The Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA")1 5 is perhaps the most
well-known result of feminist influence upon domestic violence policy.
The National Organization for Women ("NOW") and the NOW Legal
Defense Fund (now known as Legal Momentum) were key organizations
calling for the passage of VAWA, and they formed and led a working group
to draft and lobby for the legislation. 1 6 That coalition became known as
the National Task Force to End Sexual and Domestic Violence Against
Women, and it continues today the work it began in lobbying for VAWA. "7
Advocates have also had incredible success in pushing for state laws
and local ordinances that limit police officer and prosecutor discretion when
responding to domestic violence complaints. For example, most states
111 See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 169 (1987); ELIZABETH
PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY 69-144 (1987); Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of Hope: The Crime
and Punishment of Domestic Violence, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1505, 1514-16 (1998);
Wayne A. Logan, Criminal Law Sanctuaries, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 321, 367 (2003);
Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REv. 973, 974 (1991); see
also Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2, 5-7, 11-12 (2006). See
generally Deborah M. Weissman, The Personal Is Political-and Economic: Rethinking
Domestic Violence, 2007 B.Y.U. L. REV. 387 (2007) (providing a broader discussion of the
"violence as patriarchy" perspective).
112 State v. Black, 60 N.C. (Win.) 266, 267 (1864).
113 See generally ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING
(2001) (providing a rich explanation and analysis of feminist lawmaking with regard to
intimate violence).
114 Logan, supra note 111, at 374.
115 Violence Against Women Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1491 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
116 Press Release, National Organization for Women, Feminist Leaders Demand Passage
of the Violence Against Women Act (Sept. 26, 2000) (on file at
http://www.now.org/press/09-00/09-26-00-VAWA.html).
'17 Sally F. Goldfarb, "No Civilized System of Justice ": The Fate of the Violence Against
Women Act, 102 W. VA. L. REv. 499, 542-43 (2000).
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require the police to arrest suspected batterers whenever there is probable
cause.118 Some feminist advocates, citing instances in which police officers
failed to remove a batterer from the home because of socially constructed
ideas about the acceptability of wife-beating or arrested both parties
because they could not ascertain which party was the aggressor, rallied
behind these laws. A second example is the "no-drop" policy in some cities
and states, which establishes that prosecutors may not dismiss a domestic
violence case because the victim changes her mind about pressing
charges.'1 19 Feminist activism was essential in forming these laws. 120 While
some feminists assert that these policies are problematic because they
impinge upon women's freedom to decide whether to prosecute, 121 many
feminist domestic violence activists and scholars have expressed support for
these laws.12 2 Feminist advocacy has brought about a wide range of policy
changes on domestic violence prosecution, ranging from the broad and non-
discretionary use of protective orders, to specialized domestic violence
courts, to new federal evidentiary rules. 
123
Many feminist advocates who work within the battered women's and
anti-rape movements frequently argue that the state still does not do enough
to express societal outrage at crimes against women and children, thereby
118 Suk, supra note 111, at 12 n.26.
119 See Donna Wills, Domestic Violence: The Case for Aggressive Prosecution, 7 UCLA
WOMEN's L.J. 173, 173 (1997).
120 See Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of
Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 1657, 1668-72 (2004) (explaining the
movement toward mandatory arrest and no-drop policies across the United States in the
1980s and 1990s).
121 See, e.g., G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic
Violence, and the Conservatization of the Battered Women's Movement, 42 HoUs. L. REV.
237, 243 (2005); Linda G. Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State
Intervention, 113 HARv. L. REv. 550, 554 (1999).
122 See, e.g., Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in
Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1849, 1907-09 (1996); Lisa G. Lerman,
The Decontextualization of Domestic Violence, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 217, 224-25
(1992) ("Even if a law enforcement approach fails to result in specific deterrence in some
cases, enforcement of the law.., sends an appropriate message to the community-that
domestic violence is not acceptable."). Some advocates express concern that the laws are
not as effective as they could be, but still support the message that they send about the
gravity of intimate violence.
123 Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REv. 741, 747 (2007); see also
Tom Lininger, Evidentiary Issues in Federal Prosecutions of Violence Against Women, 36
IND. L. REv. 687, 687-90 (2003); Suk, supra note 111, at 12; Betsy Tsai, Note, The Trend
Toward Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: Improvements on an Effective Innovation, 68
FORDHAM L. REV. 1285, 1287 (2000).
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demonstrating its lack of regard for their lives. 124  Elizabeth Rapaport,
among others, has written on this issue as it relates to spousal homicide.
125
Rapaport notes the existence of a "domestic discount" for killing women
and children, arguing that domestic murders "are not merely among the
worst expressions of domestic violence but also among the worst forms of
lethal violence."1 26 She postulates that "[i]n a world in which women-or
women and children-wrote criminal statutes, domestic murder might
trigger the possibility of capital prosecution."' 127 Rapaport thus contends
that true acknowledgment of the gravity of harming women and children
would result in the harsh penalties for violating them, and the fact that
many crimes against women and children occur within the family would not
mitigate against the harshest penalties, including capital punishment.
128
While Rapaport is discussing homicide, not rape, her work is an additional
demonstration of how some parts of the feminist movement have sought
equality through deployment of the criminal law. Some feminist activists
perceive the protectionist ethos and rhetoric of some advocates against
intimate and intrafamilial violence as a perpetuation of a patriarchal,
chivalric approach to women's equality,129 but many feminists, especially
those who work or research in the field of criminal law, share a view closer
to Rapaport's.
124 See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering: A
Call to Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 959, 959-60 (2004)
("The disconnect between battering as it is practiced and battering as it is criminalized is vast
and it is significant. Law's failure to define accurately the nature and harm of domestic
violence negates the experiences of victims and effectively places battering outside the reach
of criminal sanctions."). Cf Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Feminist
Responses to Violent Injustice, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 967, 976 (1998) ("[F]eminist activists
tend to support adversarial trials and punishment as responses to harms to women.").
125 Elizabeth Rapaport, Capital Murder and the Domestic Discount: A Study of Capital
Domestic Murder in the Post-Furman Era, 49 SMU L. REV. 1507, 1508 (1996) (arguing
against "automatic mitigation" for domestic homicides); see also Wendy Keller, Disparate
Treatment of Spouse Murder Defendants, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 255 (1996).
126 Rapaport, supra note 125, at 1508.
127 Id. at 1512.
128 Id. at 1509-10, 1532.
129 Importantly, leading feminists during the era of Coker actively opposed capital rape
laws. Feminists, including now-Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the NOW Legal Defense
Fund, and the Women's Law Project, authored an amicus brief in Coker lambasting the
capital rape laws as "a vestige of an ancient, patriarchal view of women as the property of
men, as a reflection of societal ambivalence toward the woman victim, and as a barrier to
proper and vigorous enforcement of rape laws." Brief for the American Civil Liberties
Union et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9, Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584
(1977) (No. 75-5444); see also Miccio, supra note 121, at 241-42 (differentiating between




Capital defense lawyer Phyllis L. Crocker speaks to the entwinement
of feminism with criminal law advocacy in her essay Feminism and
Defending Men on Death Row. 130 Crocker tells the story of her first capital
defense in a rape-murder case, noting the "dissonance for a feminist" in
both representing men who commit rape-murder crimes and in feeling
"vindicated" by the state's demonstration for concern about women's and
children's lives. 131 Capital child rape laws, like tighter laws on domestic
homicide, might produce internal conflict for feminist anti-domestic
violence and anti-sexual assault advocates. When one considers that a high
proportion of child rapists are fathers, stepfathers, or other close relatives of
their victims, 132 capital child rape statutes can be viewed, in some sense, as
a form of resistance against intrafamilial violence. Of course, a death
penalty statute is unlikely to be an effective intervention and may, in fact,
be counterproductive given the already low rates at which victims of incest
report crimes. 133
The women's-equality-sparked sensibility to sexual and intrafamilial
violence has been a fundamental improvement to our legal system.
However, some strands of feminism may create a chilling effect on the
progressive movement's inclination to resist capital child rape laws. Efforts
to ensure that violence against women and children is treated with the same
gravity as violence against men have led to the increasing deployment of
criminal law in the domestic sphere, and, most relevantly for this inquiry, a
ratcheting up in the availability of the death penalty for sexual and domestic
crimes.
V. AGGRAVATING FACTORS AND VULNERABLE VICTIMS
In the 1972 landmark decision Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court
ruled that the death penalty, as applied in every state that provided for it at
130 Phyllis L. Crocker, Feminism and Defending Men on Death Row, 29 ST. MARY'S L.J.
981 (1998).
131 Id. at 982-83.
132 See, e.g., HOWARD N. SNYDER, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, SEXUAL ASSAULT OF YOUNG CHILDREN AS REPORTED TO LAW ENFORCEMENT:
VICTIM, INCIDENT, AND OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS 10 (2000), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/saycrle.pdf. The Department of Justice reports that in
over 34% of reported cases of juvenile sexual assault, the perpetrator was a family member.
That number jumps to 42.4% if the child is between the ages six and eleven, and 48.6%
when the child is between birth and five years of age. It is important to note that these are
just cases reported to law enforcement-most sex crimes, especially those within families,
go unreported. See Maggie Bruck et al., Reliability and Credibility of Young Children's
Reports: From Research to Policy and Practice, in CHILDREN AND THE LAW: THE ESSENTIAL
READINGS 87, 89 (Ray Bull ed., 2001).
133 See Bruck et al., supra note 132, at 89.
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the time, violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because of its
arbitrariness and inconsistency. 134 Furman consolidated three cases which
all resulted in death sentences: one defendant was convicted of murder and
two were convicted of rape. 135 The Court concluded that because the juries
had free reign to determine which crimes were heinous enough to warrant
death, the punishment was cruel and unusual.136 Because juries were not
guided by legal standards for what constituted death-eligible crimes, there
was too much space for irrational bias to taint capital sentencing. 1
37
After Furman, the vast majority of states-at least thirty-five-
revisited their death penalty statutes to find ways to limit juries' discretion
and to thus rectify the arbitrariness problem. 138 States began to divide the
guilt and sentencing phases of capital trials using different juries. States
also started including statutory limits on which kinds of cases were eligible
for death sentences and the kinds of information about defendants that
juries should weigh in favor of not imposing a death sentence. In Gregg v.
Georgia,'39 which overturned Furman's moratorium on executions, the
former set of statutory limits on death sentencing became labeled nationally
as "aggravating circumstances" (or "aggravating factors") and the latter are
"mitigating circumstances" (or "mitigating factors"). 140
Aggravating and mitigating factors require juries to consider
individual attributes of both the crime and the offender. When the
jurisprudence of aggravating and mitigating factors was still in its nascence,
the purpose of aggravating factors was to narrow death-eligible crimes
significantly to the most heinous acts. 14 1 Thus, early aggravating factors
might include the existence of previous felony convictions or multiple
victims. Initially, states deemed the worst crimes to be those that exacted
some violence against the state or property. Criminal law, in general,
considers whether a crime was committed in cold or hot blood-that is,
whether the person who committed the crime was passionate or calculating.
134 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam); id. at 255-57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
"' Id. at 239.
136 Id.
131 Id. at 255-57 (Douglas, J., concurring). It is worth noting that Furman was litigated
by NAACP Legal Defense Fund lawyers in the shadow of the Civil Rights Movement, and
the Court understood that the arbitrariness of sentencing was at least partially attributable to
racially biased jurors, although it did not accept the petitioners' race discrimination
argument. See id. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring).
138 See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593-94 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
179-80 (1976).
139 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
140 See id. passim.
141 The requirement that aggravating factors "genuinely narrow the class of persons
eligible for the death penalty" was established in Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983).
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Aggravating factors in most states' original post-Gregg death penalty
statutes reflected this perspective, and the Supreme Court vigorously
required clear aggravating circumstances.1 42 In Godfrey v. Georgia, for
example, the Court struck down a Georgia aggravating factor that the crime
"was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved
torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim," because
of its subjectivity. 143  Similarly, in Maynard v. Cartwright, the Court
overturned an Oklahoma defendant's death sentence because the jury based
its sentence on its finding that the crime was "especially heinous, atrocious,
or cruel."'
144
That began to change when the Court ruled in Walton v. Arizona that
Arizona's "especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner" aggravating
factor was not unconstitutionally vague. 45  In this case, Jeffrey Alan
Walton and two friends were convicted of murdering Thomas Powell, an
off-duty Marine whom they encountered at a bar.146  The men robbed
Powell at gunpoint, forced him into their car, and drove him to a secluded
location. 147  There, defendant Walton shot him, but he did not die
immediately-a coroner surmised that Powell died six days after the
shooting of dehydration, starvation, and pneumonia. 48 A jury convicted
Walton of first degree murder, and the trial judge conducted a sentencing
hearing 149 in which he found that Walton's crime met two of Arizona's
statutory aggravating factors: the murder was conducted for pecuniary
gain 50 and it was committed in an "especially heinous, cruel, or depraved
manner."'151 Despite Gregg's admonition that states construct death penalty
legislation so that potential arbitrariness is minimized, 52 the Court upheld
the law.
142 See, e.g., Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 363-64 (1988); Godfrey v. Georgia,
446 U.S. 420, 432 (1980) (plurality opinion).
143 446 U.S. at 432.
'A 486 U.S. at 364.
145 497 U.S. 639 (1990), overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584,
589 (2002).
146 Id. at 644.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 644-45.
149 The second important holding of Walton upheld judicial sentencing. The Supreme
Court overturned this portion of the Walton holding in Ring.
So Walton, 497 U.S. at 645.
151 Id.
' See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 ("[W]here discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a
matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that




The Court distinguished on two grounds the sentencing scheme in
Arizona from the ones it had earlier prohibited. First, in Arizona, all
sentencing fact-finding and decision-making were carried out by the trial
judge. The Court presumed this judge would mediate against arbitrariness
because judges are supposedly more likely to follow the law than their
personal views. 153 However, this factor is no longer applicable because
judicial sentencing is no longer constitutional. Second, and more enduring,
is the fact that case law subsequent to the addition of the "especially
heinous, cruel, or depraved" factor had sufficiently clarified the legal
content of the facially subjective standard so that it was no longer
arbitrary. 154 The Court has continued to uphold similar aggravating factors
if they have limiting constructions.
The Court again upheld a subjective factor, that the accused "exhibited
utter disregard for human life," in Arave v. Creech.155 Creech involved a
mass murderer who had admitted to murdering or helping to murder at least
twenty-six victims.1 56 He claimed that he would not be able to stop killing
people unless he was completely isolated for the rest of his life, and he
plead guilty to his most recent crime, the murder of a fellow inmate. The
judge, like other judges in Idaho at the time, carried out capital sentencing
guided by the statutory aggravating factors.157 Although the words of the
statute themselves are vague, the Court found the Idaho Supreme Court's
limiting construction that "utter disregard for human life ... is meant to be
reflective of acts or circumstances surrounding the crime which exhibit the
highest, the utmost, callous disregard for human life, i.e., the cold-blooded,
pitiless slayer" to be sufficient.1
58
Similar factors exist in other states. For example, Georgia now allows
death sentences in homicides that are "outrageously wanton or vile," the
language declared unconstitutional in Godfrey. The factor passes
constitutional muster when tempered with the limiting language that the
homicide "involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to
the victim. 1
59
In addition to aggravating factors becoming progressively more
subjective, they have also increased in sheer numbers to include crimes that
are, both directly and indirectly, sexual and intrafamilial. Professor Jeffrey
Kirchmeier has documented this rapid expanse of aggravating factors,
153 Walton, 497 U.S. at 653.
154 Id. at 655.
155 507 U.S. 463, 471 (1993).
156 Id. at 465.
117 Id. at 465-66.
158 Id. at 468-69 (citing State v. Creech, 670 P.2d 463, 471 (Idaho 1983)).
159 GA. CODEANN. § 17-10-30 (2007).
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despite increasing concern about the efficacy of the death penalty. 160
Aggravating factors now include child abuse or neglect, sexual abuse or
exploitation of a child, that the defendant was under a domestic violence
order of protection, that the victim was a child, that the victim was elderly
or disabled, that the victim was a family member, or that the victim was an
unborn child.1
61
While it is, on some level, encouraging to see that the government no
longer devalues crimes against women and children to the same extent that
it once did, these types of factors open the door for extraordinary race,
gender, sexual orientation, and other biases. In a political climate that adds
aggravating factors designed to value the most vulnerable and sympathetic,
capital child rape statutes do not seem outrageous. In fact, they appear to be
almost logical extensions of criminal and family law. However, it is
precisely because these statutes are a tainted result of a charged and
subjectivist political climate that they open the door for unconstitutional
arbitrariness.
VI. CONCLUSION: NORMATIVE VALUE OF THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT
ACCOUNT?
This Article's descriptive social movement account may shed some
light on normative questions. An understanding of the factors that
influence adoption of capital child rape laws leads us to consider the
constitutionality of such laws. One concern that mirrors Coker is the
potential for arbitrariness connected to prejudice. When the Coker Court
ruled that using death as punishment for the rape of an adult woman was
unconstitutional, it was not only disproportionality but a lack of a national
consensus on capital rape law that shaped the Court's findings. Coker was
litigated in the shadow of mass fear, intense racial prejudice, lobbying for
harsher penalties for sex crimes, and experimental "tinker[ing] with the
machinery of death."162
Abundant evidence supports the entwinement of race and rape. The
perception of African-American men as rapists (and particularly as rapists
of white women) has colored public discourse on issues ranging from
160 Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The Paradox of Today's
Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital Punishment Scheme, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 345,
363-81 (1998); Kirchmeier, Casting a Wider Net, supra note 4.
161 Kirchmeier, Casting a Wider Net, supra note 4, at 18-25.
162 See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Given
the Court's fairly recent decisions in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), and Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), not to mention the innocence movement, which has made
some death penalty states more hesitant to execute people, the status of the death penalty
seems almost as precarious as it did in 1977, one year after Gregg reinstated executions.
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school integration to criminal justice. 63 The lynching epidemic that was
only beginning to subside during this era can be tied to perceptions of black
males' status as rapists.' 64 The significance of the link between perpetrator
race and age is evident in the Coker Petitioner's Brief. Despite the Court's
silence on the historical racial context of the death penalty for rape in the
opinion (and despite the fact that the defendant in Coker was white), the
brief raises the race discrimination question as one of its central
arguments. 65 Child rape statutes, though not laden with the exact same
racial baggage as more general rape statutes, are still racialized. The "child
molester" image has been deployed by some against Latino men in
particular, a troubling stereotype in an age of rampant anti-immigrant bias
that has focused primarily on Latinos. 66 The molester image has also been
attached to the LGBT community as a weapon against gay marriage and
gay adoption. 1
67
The laws adopted in Coker also coincided with the Women's
Liberation Movement, which in some comers lobbied for harsher penalties
for rape. While the capital rape laws struck down in Coker may not have
been adopted at feminists' behest-in fact, they might have been expressly
opposed by many feminists because of their protectionist approach' 68-the
potential tension between some strands of feminism and anti-death penalty
advocacy is present in the capital child rape cases.
Moreover, the status of the death penalty is in flux now, as it was in
1977. At the same time that some states are adopting capital child rape
statutes and expanding the list of aggravating factors, state legislatures are
163 See Frank Rudy Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
853, 875-79 (2006).
164 N. Jeremi Duru, The Central Park Five, the Scottsboro Boys, and the Myth of the
Bestial Black Man, 25 CARDoZO L. REV. 1315, 1326-27 (2004).
165 Brief for the Petitioner at 54, Coker v. Georgia 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (No. 75-5444)
("There is historical evidence that, in Georgia, the death penalty for rape was specifically
devised as a punishment for the rape of white women by black men.").
166 See, e.g., Madeleine Cosman, Violent Sexual Predators Who Are Illegal Aliens,
NEWSWITHVIEWS.COM (May 29, 2005), available at http://www.newswithviews.com/
Cosman/madeleine5.htm; R. Cort Kirkwood, "Family Values ": Illegal Aliens and Their Sex
Crimes, CHRONICLES (Apr. 2007), available at http://www.chroniclesmagazine.org/?p=30.
These views are hardly representative, but racial stereotypes of this nature infect the legal
system and open the door for arbitrariness.
167 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Body Politics: Lawrence v. Texas and the
Constitution of Disgust and Contagion, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1011, 1018 (2005) (describing an
advertising campaign to nullify gay rights ordinances that associated homosexuality with
danger to children).




increasingly enacting moratoria on the death penalty. 169  While popular
support for capital punishment continues, 170 the Supreme Court struck down
the death penalty for juvenile offenders and the mentally retarded in Roper
and Atkins.' 7' None of these factors individually entail certain demise for
capital child rape law supporters' claims, but they reflect a similar social
and constitutional environment to that of Coker.
This Article has attempted to describe briefly how long-term social
movements and short-term bursts of outrage are interacting with the
political environment for capital child rape laws. This account attempts to
lay a foundation for understanding precisely why capital child rape laws are
just as constitutionally problematic as the capital rape laws in Coker.
Public reaction may provide a strong ground for declaring these statutes
unconstitutional since, as the era of lynching taught, mass outrage can lead
to mob violence. Enlisting the state to legitimate this outrage, when law
generally calls on actors to be as dispassionate as possible, is perverse. The
subjectivity and emotionalism likely to inhere in widespread application of
capital child rape laws will almost certainly yield extreme arbitrariness and
inadequate process for many defendants.
When a law threatens to impinge on constitutional rights, and
especially when those at risk are those whom society would most like to
cast out or even exterminate, courts must understand and evaluate the social
forces that motivated these laws. Today, child molestation sparks the same
urge for community isolationism and spirit of vigilantism that rape did in
the Coker era. An analysis of the multilayered political context of capital
child rape laws suggests that the social forces surrounding the new
legislation are inescapably too intense, too frenzied, too emotional, and too
mired in racial and class-based prejudice to avoid arbitrariness and caprice.
169 See, e.g., Michael L. Radelet, More Trends Toward Moratoria on Executions, 33
CONN. L. REV. 845, 848-51 (2001); Ronald J. Tabak, Finality Without Fairness: Why We Are
Moving Towards Moratoria on Executions, and the Potential Abolition of Capital
Punishment, 33 CONN. L. REV. 733, 752-62 (2001). See also Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Another
Place Beyond Here: The Death Penalty Moratorium Movement in the United States, 73 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1, 5 (2002) (identifying a "Death Penalty Moratorium Movement").
170 See, e.g., ABC News/Washington Post Poll (June 22-25, 2006), available at
http://www.pollingreport.com/crime.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2007). In June 2006, 65% of
adults polled nationwide supported the death penalty-this was down from 77% in August
1996, but still demonstrates a strong majority. Id.
171 See supra note 37.
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